Chrome limits CT logs to RSA and ECDSA.

On 17 November 2026 Chrome's CT Log Policy set cryptographic bounds on what a log may accept: roots with RSA or ECDSA keys only, and from 15 December no certificate chain with any other key or signature. We checked every certificate in our index and the accepted roots of all 80 logs in Chrome's list. No certificate issued today is outside the bounds; eight logs still accept three roots with DSA keys; and seven CAs hold post-quantum pilot roots that these logs may not take.

What the policy now says

Ryan Dickson announced the change for Chrome's CT team on the ct-policy list. It has two parts, and both apply to logs in the Pending, Qualified and Usable states.

Accepted roots, effective immediately. A log may include a root in its set of accepted roots only if the root's public key is RSA or ECDSA. Roots with any other key, post-quantum and composite keys such as ML-DSA included, must not be there, even when another standard or root program allows them. A root that arrives through automated synchronization with the CCADB has to be removed.

Submissions, from 15 December 2026. A log must reject a submission in which any certificate of the chain has a public key other than RSA or ECDSA, or is signed with another algorithm. Logs may start rejecting such submissions now.

A log that does not comply may be removed from Chrome's log list. Operators who want to log other certificate types can do so in separate logs that are not in Chrome's lists and are not applying to be.

“We reviewed about 880 million leaf certificates and precertificates already logged to Usable logs and found none that these requirements would exclude”

— Chrome CT team, ct-policy, 17 November 2026

The stated reason is load: certificates that Chrome does not rely on add storage, bandwidth and verification work for logs and monitors and put log availability at risk, with no security benefit to Chrome users.

Certificates: nothing issued today is outside the bounds

Our live index holds 7,972,705,493 certificates that are valid now or expired since December 2025, a precertificate and its final certificate counted once. By public key and signature algorithm:

public keysignaturecertificates
RSARSA with SHA-2564,045,533,795
ECDSAECDSA with SHA-3842,046,440,937
ECDSAECDSA with SHA-2561,623,546,792
RSARSA with SHA-384221,650,948
ECDSARSA with SHA-25632,969,368
RSAECDSA with SHA-2561,889,033
RSARSA with SHA-512293,938
RSAECDSA with SHA-384233,593
ECDSARSA with SHA-384146,575
RSARSA with SHA-1301
ECDSARSA with SHA-512212
RSARSA-PSS with SHA-2561
any other key or signature0

That is nine times the sample Chrome reviewed, with the same result. Every key is RSA or ECDSA and so is every signature; the one RSA-PSS certificate is still RSA.

The archive goes back further. Its index covers certificates logged since 2013 that have since expired, 26 billion hostname entries, and records the key type of each. There the bounds do cut something off: 631 certificates with DSA keys.

issuing CADSA certificatesissued
Symantec Class 3 DSA EV SSL CA2442013 – 2017
Symantec Class 3 DSA SSL CA2192013 – 2017
GeoTrust DSA SSL CA642013 – 2017
thawte DSA SSL CA372014 – 2017
RapidSSL Enterprise DSA SSL CA122015
15 other CAs (WoSign, StartCom, Equifax, CAcert and others)552007 – 2016
all631

Nine in ten came from Symantec's DSA hierarchy, sold under the Symantec, GeoTrust, thawte and RapidSSL names. Issuance peaked at 183 certificates in 2015; the newest was issued on 23 November 2017 and the last expired in November 2020. For the archive we have the key type but not the signature algorithm.

The archive index also holds five test certificates with an experimental post-quantum key (public key identifier 1.3.9999.6.7.13), issued between January 2023 and October 2024 for quantumsafe.test.emmm.dev and valid.cert.demoteam.ch. One log recorded them, and it is not among the Pending, Qualified or Usable logs. This is the kind of entry the new rule keeps out.

Roots: eight logs accept three DSA roots

We asked every Pending, Qualified and Usable log in Chrome's list (version 97.4 of 17 November 2026: 39 Usable and 41 Qualified logs, none Pending) for its accepted roots and looked at the key of each root. All 80 answered. Eight of them, all RFC 6962 logs, accept the same three roots with DSA keys:

operatorlogsaccepted rootswith a DSA key
CloudflareCloudflare Nimbus2026, Nimbus20276153
DigiCertWyvern2026h2, Wyvern2027h1, Wyvern2027h2, Sphinx2026h2, Sphinx2027h1, Sphinx2027h2429 – 5473
rootkey and signaturevalid
Symantec Class 3 Public Primary Certification Authority - G7DSA, DSA with SHA-2562012-10-15 – 2037-12-01
GeoTrust Primary Certification Authority - G4DSA, DSA with SHA-2562012-10-15 – 2037-12-01
thawte Primary Root CA - G4DSA, DSA with SHA-2562012-10-15 – 2037-12-01

These are the roots of the hierarchy that issued the DSA certificates above. Our index has nothing issued under them since 2017, and their intermediates expired in December 2022, but the roots themselves run to 2037 and are still on the two operators' lists. Chrome's announcement says that no root outside the bounds appears in the CCADB reports that logs synchronize with; these three reach the logs some other way. By the letter of the policy they are outside the bounds today.

No log in the list accepts a root with an EdDSA or ML-DSA key.

What is waiting: post-quantum pilot roots

The rule is aimed at what comes next. Our store of CA certificates holds seven self-signed roots with ML-DSA keys, each valid for one year and created within two weeks of each other in the summer of 2026:

rootCAvalid
UniTrust Global TLS MLDSA Root R1 TESTUniTrust2026-06-25 – 2027-06-25
Sectigo Pilot Server Authentication Root M27Sectigo2026-07-02 – 2027-07-01
HARICA TLS ML Root CA 2026 - PilotHARICA2026-07-02 – 2027-07-02
ComSign Dev Root PQ CAComSign2026-07-06 – 2027-07-06
IdenTrust Pilot Root TLS ML-DSA CA 1IdenTrust2026-07-06 – 2027-07-06
SSL.com TLS ML Root CA 2026 - PilotSSL.com2026-07-07 – 2027-07-07
DigiCert PQC TLS PILOT MLDSA87 Root CADigiCert2026-07-09 – 2027-07-09

None of the 80 logs accepts any of them, and under the new policy none may. A CA that wants its post-quantum pilot certificates in CT has to send them to a log outside Chrome's lists.

What it means

For CAs: nothing changes for certificates issued today. Post-quantum experiments stay out of the logs browsers rely on, pilot roots included, until Chrome changes the bounds.

For log operators: check the accepted roots now and the submission path by 15 December. Cloudflare and DigiCert have three DSA roots to drop from eight logs; for everyone else the root list already fits. The submission check has to look at every certificate of the chain, not only the leaf.

For monitors and site owners: nothing to do. No certificate in today's logs falls outside the bounds.

ctlogs.dev reads all of these logs; coverage and sync status for each is on the monitored logs page.

Sources

Published 17 November 2026 by ctlogs.dev. Certificate data and accepted roots as of 2026-11-17, from our Certificate Transparency index.